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PROFESSIONALIZING MORAL DEFERENCE 
Michael Hatfield* 
I. THE TORTURE MEMO 
As I write this Essay, legal memoranda about torture, once again, are 
headline news.1 This Essay considers these memoranda.  However, this Es-
say does not address the legality of torture or the legal limits of interroga-
tion or even if lawyers who provide bad advice on these issues should be 
punished.2  Instead, this Essay uses what has come to light about the ―tor-
ture memoranda‖ to consider broader issues about the contemporary state of 
becoming and being an American lawyer.  With new memoranda being re-
leased, for the sake of convenience, this Essay refers only to the best-known 
example (at least as things currently stand), which is the August 1, 2002 
memo to Alberto Gonzales signed by Jay Bybee and prepared by John 
Yoo.3  Without substantive consideration of counterarguments, that memo-
randum concluded that torture was not illegal—at least not if the President 
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  See Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, Interrogation Memos Detail Harsh Tactics by the C.I.A., 
NYTIMES.COM, Apr. 16, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/17/us/politics/17detain.html?pagewanted=print (link).   
2
  Cf., e.g., Peter Finn, Holder Urged to Probe Allegations of Torture, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Mar. 
18, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/17/AR2009031702639.html 
(chronicling the ACLU‘s efforts to convince the Attorney General to launch a criminal investigation into 
the conduct of the Bush administration) (link). 
3
  Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att‘y Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the 
President (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter the Torture Memo], available at 
http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/nytimes/docs/doj/bybee80102mem.pdf (link).  See Paul M. 
Barrett, A Young Lawyer Helps Chart Shift in Foreign Policy, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2005, at A1.   
4
  The Torture Memo, supra note 3, at 1–2, 33–39, 46. 
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was not written in a good-faith effort to constrain any possibly illegal beha-
vior, but rather as a shield against future prosecution.5   
II. THE QUESTION 
The overwhelming consensus of the American bar is that torture, even 
when called ―enhanced interrogation,‖ is not permissible.6  I do not write to 
question or defend this conclusion.  I begin with it.  I write for those who 
accept that conclusion, and I write to ask: how do otherwise competent 
lawyers persuade themselves that torture is permissible?  How could other-
wise good lawyers get such a serious issue so wrong?   
The question has no readily apparent answers.  We ought not to answer 
that Jay Bybee, John Yoo, or others were merely political hacks.7  That is 
not an explanation.  Rather, it would only push the question into a slightly 
different format.  We ought not to answer that they were otherwise immoral 
men.  No one has alleged that to be the case.  Nor can we answer that they 
were poorly trained, under-educated, or generally incompetentthey had 
risen, after all, to the position of legal advisers to the President of the Unit-
ed States.8  There is no reason of which I know to characterize these law-





  According to Origins of Aggressive Interrogation Techniques, these memoranda were intended to 
―create a shield to make it difficult or impossible to hold anyone accountable for‖ torture.  The Origins 
of Aggressive Interrogation Techniques: Part I of the Committee’s Inquiry into the Treatment of Detai-
nees in U.S. Custody: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 110th Cong. 9 (2008) [herei-
nafter The Origins of Aggressive Interrogation Techniques Hearings] (link); Richard Neuborne et al., 
Torture: The Road to Abu Ghraib and Beyond, in THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA 31 (Karen J. 
Greenberg ed., 2006) (quoting Stephen Gillers).  Richard B. Bilder and Detlev F. Vagts note that Donald 
Rumsfeld invoked the ―advice of counsel‖ defense in a televised interview.  See Richard B. Bilder & 
Detlev F. Vagts, Speaking Law to Power: Lawyers and Torture, in THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA, 
supra, at 151, 160 n.32. 
6
  See, e.g., W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law and Morals, 91 CORNELL 
L. REV. 67 (2005) (providing a detailed criticism of the infamous Torture Memo) (link).  Calling the 
Torture Memo a legal analysis of which no one ―could be proud,‖ id. at 68, Wendel cites several sources 
identifying ethical lapses and even blatant incompetence in the preparation of the memo: ―‗[I]n my pro-
fessional opinion, the August 1, 2002 OLC Memorandum is perhaps the most clearly erroneous legal 
opinion I have ever read.‘‖  Id. at 68 n.2 (quoting Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Alberto R. 
Gonzales to be Attorney General of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 
158 (2005) (statement of Harold Hongju Koh).  See also Gail H. Miller, Defining Torture, 3 
FLOERSHEIMER CENTER OCCASIONAL PAPERS SERIES (2005), available at 
http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/cms/uploadedFiles/FLOERSHEIMER/Defining%20Torture.pdf (explaining 
the technical definition of torture under international and U.S. law) (link); Robert K. Goldman, Trivializ-
ing Torture: The Office Of Legal Counsel’s 2002 Opinion Letter And International Law Against Tor-
ture, 12 NO. 1 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 1 (2004) (discussing the legal prohibitions of torture beyond those 
contained in international treaties) (link).    
7
  See, e.g., Scott Horton, Yoo Two, HARPERS.ORG, Apr. 3, 2008, 
http://www.harpers.org/archive/2008/04/hbc-90002785 (link). 
8
  As a legal matter, the purpose of an Office of Legal Counsel memo is to advise the President as to 
the state of the law and to serve as a legal interpretation binding on the executive branch of the federal 
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If these were not anomalously defective lawyers, the question becomes 
harder to answer: how could well-trained, competent, otherwise moral law-
yers conclude that torture is permissible?  It is the same type of question 
that would arise if well-trained, competent, otherwise moral lawyers con-
cluded that slavery is permissible so long as it is termed ―permanent em-
ployment.‖ If we cannot trust the arguments of well-trained, competent, 
otherwise moral lawyers on the torture issue, I believe we ought to consider 
not merely the individual lawyers involved, but also the process of becom-
ing and being a lawyer.  
I believe these lawyers began with the objective of justifying torture.  
They concluded that they were obligated to justify torture, and then they set 
out to do so.  Whoever was ultimately responsible for requesting the Tor-
ture Memo apparently had such an objective, and the lawyers, apparently, 
accepted that position as a morally acceptable starting point.  They made a 
bad moral conclusion, and I believe it drove them to make a bad legal ar-
gument.9   
That characterization raises a reasonable and appealing response.  If 
the problem is that a bad moral conclusion drove bad legal reasoning, then 
perhaps the solution is to tell lawyers to put moral reasoning aside and fo-
cus on legal reasoning.10  Perhaps the problem is simply that the Torture 
Memo was ―crummy legal advice‖ motivated by the personal morality of 
the lawyers.11  If so, the solution is to insist that the morality of the greater 
good requires that a lawyer‘s personal moral convictions be laid aside so 
that the lawyer can focus on the craft of lawyering.12   
To interpret the problem with the Torture Memo as one of craftsman-
ship makes the issue into a matter of sufficient memo length and citations.  
The solution for failing to cite contrary authorities is to cite them, and then 
to argue their inapplicability.  Ignoring an authority is poor craftsmanship; 
citing and distinguishing that authority is good craftsmanship.  To diagnose 
the problem as one of poor craftsmanship suggests that, among all the poss-
ible legal memoranda, one memorandum could perhaps be crafted to reach 
the same conclusions in a defensible manner.  It is just not this one.  Per-
haps some mad genius lawyer counterpart to the mad genius scientist could, 
                                                                                                                           
government.  See Randolph D. Moss, Executive Branch Legal Interpretation: A Perspective from the 
Office of Legal Counsel, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1303, 1305 (2000) (link). 
9
  A separate issue is whether their moral conclusions were formed prior to their engagement in the 
memorandum production or as a result of that engagement.  See David Luban, Integrity: Its Causes and 
Cures, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 279, 279–83 (2003) (link).  
10
  W. Bradley Wendel, W.F. Wickmire Memorial Lecture: Executive Branch Lawyers in a Time of 
Terror, DALHOUSIE L.J. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 23, on file with SSRN.com, last revised Apr. 4, 
2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1372744 (link).  
11
  Id. (manuscript at 14).   
12
  Id. (manuscript at 5–6, 13). 
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in fact, tightly argue to the pro-torture legal conclusions.13  But is the prob-
lem really that these lawyers were insufficiently genius?  That their memos 
simply were too hasty, too short, and too shoddy?   
Such a formulation conceives of the practice of law as one of technical 
rather than strategic advice.  But lawyers reason strategically.14  Lawyers 
are not paid to answer ―yes‖ or ―no.‖  The lawyerly response is always, 
―This is how we get there,‖or, at least, as near to there as we can get 
from herewith the definition of ―there‖ determined by the client‘s situa-
tion, of course.   
Diagnosing the problem as one of craft distracts us from a more troub-
ling question.  Lawyers fail to meet professional performance standards on 
a daily basis.  It is, I suppose, the common cold of our profession.  And it is 
an ethical issue.  But it is not headline news.   
On the other hand, that highly trained officers of the American judicial 
systema system with a legitimate claim of belonging among the most just 
in the world, and moreover the judicial system of the most powerful nation 
in the worldwould accept that torturing those held in American custody is 
a morally acceptable objective for a legal memorandum . . . .  Now that is 
headline news.  What went wrong with these lawyers?  Everyone agrees the 
Torture Memo is shoddy.  But why were these lawyers willing to write it?   
III. ANSWERING THE QUESTION 
Why would well-trained, competent, otherwise moral lawyers accept 
that torture is a morally acceptable objective for a legal memorandum, and 
then prepare and sign such a shoddy memorandum to accomplish that ob-
jective?  I suggest that the answer to this question is that lawyers are profes-
sionalized in a manner that undermines moral reasoning skills.  To suggest 
that we who are officers of the American judicial system are deficient in 
moral reasoning is to suggest a deep problem.  I do not do so casually.   
I can cite no empirical study, but I can generalize from my personal 
experience as a law student, lawyer, law professor, and friend and colleague 
of many other law students, lawyers, and law professors.  Beginning in law 





  See id. (manuscript at 25).  If the only rightful means of criticizing these lawyers is ―digging into 
the law‖ on torture, id., we must concede before we ―dig‖ that we may be surprised by what our digging 
unearths.  Surely the pro-torture lawyers conceive the problem this way, insisting that enough open-
minded and skillful consideration of the law would swing the consensus of the bar behind their conclu-
sions.  If we were to dig in good faith, should we not assume that the consensus of the bar might be 
changed?  I label the lawyer who could swing the consensus to be ―the mad genius lawyer.‖  
14
  Strategic reasoning does not involve rejecting the notion that there are genuine obligations of 
lawfulness, or insisting that some arguments are technically implausible.  See id. (manuscript at 15, 25).  
I simply do not think that clients ask, ―What are my rights and duties?‖  See id. (manuscript at 14).  In-
stead, I think they ask, ―What are my options?‖  And I do not think lawyers ever answer, ―You are legal-
ly permitted to do such-and-such,‖ id. (manuscript at 16), but rather, ―The first option is such-and-such, 
but that requires this-and-that.  Let me explain how the second option differs.‖ 
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high-stakes issues.  We are taught to accept a division between lawyers‘ 
morality and clients‘ morality, and the primary principle of zealous advoca-
cy, as if these were part of the natural order.15  As lawyers, we spend our 
days reasoning backwards from the conclusion we ultimately want to reach 
for our clients, rather than forwards from principles we discover by ―dig-
ging‖ into the law.  Sometimes we have to adjust how close to the conclu-
sion we can come, but we start with a clear objective of, at least 
approximately, where we must arrive.  The objective, of course, reflects the 
client‘s goals and situations.  I think that is a noncontroversial description 
of what lawyers do every day.  This Essay explores my reflections on how 
lawyers come to engage in this type of strategic reasoning, my concerns 
about its cost to our moral reasoning skills, and my limited hope for how we 
may be able to recover. 
A. Professionalizing Moral Deference 
The act of being professionalized as a lawyer begins with moral desen-
sitization.  We were taught to override our moral intuition in our first year 
of law school.16  We were taught to ignore our intuition that a debt is moral-
ly owed, and were taught instead to debate only the price of refusing to pay.  
We were taught to ignore that a passerby is morally obligated to prevent a 
man from drowning, and instead to debate only the risks of a tort suit if the 
passerby watches the drowning man die.   
How would first-year law students learn to think about debts if, along-
side the statute of limitations, they learned that the first systematic legal 
ethicist concluded it unethical to plead the statute for a client who is ―con-
scious he owes the debt?‖17  I am not suggesting that moral analysis be 
substituted for legal analysis.  Nor am I suggesting that legal duties ought to 
track moral duties exactly.18  I am suggesting only that when a difference 
between the two exists, law students could learn to focus on whether or not 
the difference is justifiable, and whether or not they, as individual lawyers, 
would choose the passerby as a client.  Whether there is a duty under tort 
law to rescue a drowning man does not answer whether I want to be hired 
so that I can defend someone‘s right to watch a man die.  Day-in, day-out 
during law school, fact situations raising obvious moral issues are re-





  I do not doubt there may be a substantial difference between what our law students are learning 
and what our professional ethicists are intending to teach about zealous advocacy, for example.  I am 
considering what it is I believe law students and lawyers think they hear when ethicists speak, rather 
than what ethicists actually say. 
16
  Others, of course, have also noted that law schools do not teach students to think through the 
moral consequences of their actions, only to obsess about ―precedent‖ without any understanding of the 
moral choices lawyers make.  See Neuborne et al., supra note 5. 
17
  See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 175–176 (5th ed. 2008). 
18
  Wendel, supra note 10 (manuscript at 15).   
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The moral issues are easily swept away by the claim that the lawyer is 
not the moral endorser of his or her client‘s objectives.19  If the client has 
the legal right to foreclose on the orphanage, the lawyer is not personally 
responsible for helping the client foreclose, even if the lawyer is morally 
opposed to it.  From the beginning, we are taught that we may suspend our 
personal moral identity while we wholeheartedly invest the remainder of 
ourselves in advocating clients‘ objectives.20  What if, instead of idealizing 
the image of a lawyer who is not the moral endorser of her client‘s objec-
tives, we idealized for students the image of a lawyer working toward ob-
jectives she does morally endorse?  
From the beginning of law school, a lawyer is idealized as a zealous 
advocate for her client‘s objective.  This biased zealousness is justified by 
an appeal to the adversarial American legal system.21  Each side has a law-
yer, and each lawyer is devoted to one side.  The professional role is to fur-
ther the client‘s objective, even if, personally, the lawyer opposes it.  The 
young lawyer learns to defer to the client‘s moral conclusions about the ob-
jective.  But the young lawyer also learns to defer to the legal system‘s con-
clusions that this is what lawyers should do.  We are told to suspend our 
personal moral instincts and to have faith that the legal system accomplish-
es a greater moral good by our accepting a truncated personal moral role 
than it could accomplish if we accepted full personal moral responsibility 
for what we help our clients do.  We are professionalized into believing that 
we are at no personal moral risk so long as we do a professional job (for 
which we will be well paid).  We are told to accept the moral good of moral 
deferenceboth to our clients and to the system.  We are professionalized 
to believe that moral deference is simply what lawyers do, as if it were a 
self-evident, natural principle that pardoned our moral misgivings.   
Lawyers begin learning moral deference in law school, and then that 
deference is internalized through the routine practice of law.22  Through 
2,400 hours a year on the job, lawyers internalize that there is ―a special[,] 
professional morality‖ that has nothing to do with the morality of nonpro-





  The American Bar Association‘s Model Rules of Professional Conduct state that ―[a] lawyer‘s 
representation of a client, including representation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement 
of the client‘s political, economic, social, or moral views or activities.‖  ABA CTR. FOR PROF‘L 
RESPONSIBILITY, MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT § 1.2(b) (2002) (link).  An example is a lawyer 
who opposes smoking but lobbies for a tobacco company. 
20
  I believe this answers Burt Neuborne‘s question, ―Is there something that we are doing in Ameri-
can law schools that is allowing the best and the brightest . . . to drift into a situation where they think 
that all they have to do is find an argument that will justify their client‘s goal . . . ?‖  Neuborne et al., 
supra note 5, at 14.  This understanding of the profession is termed ―neutral partisanship.‖  DAVID 
LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 9 (2007).   
21
  See LUBAN, supra note 20, at 9.  
22
  See Luban, supra note 9, at 301. 
23
  Id. 
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other, with no sense of tension or contradiction.‖24  How could such fluidity 
not become a ―fixed part‖ of a lawyer‘s ―moral personality‖?25  Deference 
to others‘ moral conclusions becomes not only intellectually justified, but 
personally comfortable and natural.  And, as a matter of moral psychology, 
the more lawyers defer to clients, the more ―rightness‖ they begin to see in 
the client‘s objectives.26  This self-deluding process is part of how lawyers 
earn their pay, and it seems to me inescapable that such a process under-
mines the capacity for moral reflection.   
B. Moral Deference and the Pro-Torture Argument 
I believe lawyers come to regard moral deference as natural.  I believe 
this comes from the process of becoming and being a lawyer.  I believe it 
undermines lawyers‘ moral reasoning, in large part because moral and legal 
reasoning are so similar.  Both moral and legal reasoning involve consider-
ing competing values in high-stakes matters.  Lawyers do this daily.  Law-
yers get comfortable doing it.  But lawyers do it strategically.  Their 
professional skill lies in cutting through the complicated issues on high-
stakes subjects in order to advance the client‘s objective, not reflectively 
discerning the moral rightness or wrongness of the objective pursued.  But 
honest moral reasoning is never strategic.   
I speculate that a strategic, lawyerly mentality made Jay Bybee and 
John Yoo more, rather than less, susceptible to the argument that torture is 
morally permissible.  The high-quality training they had received, and the 
high-quality experience they had gained, was in moral deference—deferring 
to others to decide what the project is, and then thinking strategically about 
how to implement it.  This type of moral deference is not only inherent in 
contemporary lawyering, it is essential to the pro-torture argument.  
Deference is essential to the pro-torture argument in several ways.27  It 
is essential to defer to intelligence experts who assure you that torture 
yields good information.  It is essential to defer to the good faith and skills 
of the torturers to torture effectively rather than sadistically.  It is essential 
to defer to the detention apparatus so that only those most likely to have 
valuable information are detained and tortured.  In other words, in order to 
justify torture, you must defer to the moral clarity and practical abilities of 
everyone involved in the torture institution.  Your personal, moral squea-
mishness must give way to these experts who know the ―real truth.‖  They 





  Id. 
25
  Id. 
26
  See id. at 281–83, 301–04. 
27
  In particular, I have in mind the deference required to accept the ―ticking time bomb‖ rationale.  
See David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1426 (2005); see 
also Stephanie Athey, The Terrorist We Torture: The Tale of Abdul Hakim Murad, in ON TORTURE 87 
(Thomas C. Hilde ed., 2008) (providing a critical history of the recent usage of this narrative). 
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ly right, and what is truly wrong.  Your only moral job is to support them.  
It is your moral job to be adult enough, sober enough, serious enough, and 
strong enough to defer to their moral clarity and authority.28  
C. Moral Deference and Lawyering 
The pro-torture argument demands substantial moral deference, and the 
mainstream of the American bar assumes moral deference is justifiable.  
Are we really surprised, then, that lawyers whose ―client‖ had concluded 
that torture was a morally justified objective were willing to pursue the ob-
jective (and that, eventually, even if not initially, most likely came to share 
the moral conclusion behind the objective)?29  I believe lawyers are inclined 
to set aside initial moral squeamishness and get comfortable cutting through 
competing values on high-stakes subjects—once told which way to cut.  
Without deference, lawyers do not know in which direction to argue. 
Deferential reasoning is an intentional diffusion of moral responsibili-
ty.30  I believe it fits our natural inclination, which, despite what we may tell 
ourselves, is to follow rather than lead.31  We want to believe that someone 
else knows better.  We want to believe that we need not take the risk of fol-
lowing our own conscience, or even the trouble of discerning its voice.  As 
lawyers, we are told to defer to the client, to the system, and to accept the 
role as the most helpful (and among the best paid) followers of all.32   
But I believe this inclination to surrender personal conscientiousness in 
deference to another‘s moral conclusions is a perennial evil.  Moral defe-
rence opens the Bible as the first sin.  It is behind all state-sanctioned uses 
of violence.  It promotes lynch mobs.  It enabled Nazi atrocities.  It was 
evident in the subjects of Stanley Milgrim‘s study, who administered elec-
tric ―shocks‖ to screaming patients because they were told to do so by the 





  See Darius Rejali, Torture Makes the Man, in ON TORTURE, supra note 27, at 165–83 (discussing 
the ―manliness‖ of torture).  We have ―the worry that we have become sissies and our enemies know it.‖  
Id. at 180.  
29
  See Luban, supra note 9, at 281–83, 301–04. 
30
  The intentionality of the lawyer‘s deference distinguishes it from the more commonly understood 
―diffusion of responsibility.‖  It is a ―well-known fact,‖ for example, ―that groups of people are often 
less likely to respond helpfully in emergency situations than are individuals.‖  Luban, supra note 9, at 
283.  In the lawyer-client situation, however, the diffusion is not a result of a dysfunctional group dy-
namic but an intentional choice. 
31
  By contrast, it is notable that the military lawyers who did, by and large, consistently object to 
torture are trained to provide moral analysis as well as legal analysis.  Neuborne et al., supra note 5, at 
27 (quoting Michael (Dan) Mori). 
32
  My conclusion reflects the observation by Tzvetan Todorov that, ―in any human collectivity, 
there is a convinced, resolute minority who act, and a passive, indecisive majority who prefer to follow, 
and that the minority almost always prevails.‖  Tzvetan Todorov, Torture in the Algerian War, in ON 
TORTURE, supra note 27, at 23 (Arthur Denner trans.). 
33
  See LUBAN, supra note 20, at 239–66 (analyzing Stanley Milgrim‘s famous experiments in the 
context of professional legal ethics).   
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own moral hesitation, out of trust that the guy in the lab coat and the system 
that placed the guy in the lab coat in charge had greater moral clarity in the 
situation than they did.  This is moral deference.   
The lawyer defers to the client‘s conclusions about the morality of the 
objective.  The lawyer defers to the legal system‘s conclusion that the 
client, rather than the lawyer, is morally responsible for the objective.  This 
moral passivity, moral silence, moral deference, is what we associate with 
lynch mobs, Nazis, those who shock patients because they are told to, and 
those who conclude torture is permissible because experts tell them it 
should be.  And, I fear, most lawyers have accepted moral deference as jus-
tified, as if it were essential to being a good lawyer, and without consider-
ing how it affects the capacity to be a good person. 
Moral deference is a problem deeper than legal ethics.  It seems to be a 
recurring temptation for everyone, and, best as I can tell, there is no effec-
tive cure.  Neither intellectualism nor rational enlightenment seems suffi-
cient—at least not sufficient to remove genocide and torture from human 
experience.  The German intellectual heritage did not prevent Nazism, and 
enlightened French culture did not prevent the French from torturing Alge-
rians.34  The Germans were well-educated and well-cultured, as were the 
French.  So were Jay Bybee and John Yoo.  It did not protect their victims.   
D. Darkness and Light 
But there is good reason not to despair.  While most of Stanley Mil-
grim‘s subjects ―shocked‖ screaming patients because they were told to do 
so, a great many of them did not.35  While most German lawyers who were 
asked wrote tidy legal opinions to support their Nazi clients‘ objectives, 
some did not.36  While some U.S. government lawyers claimed torture was 
legal, some did not.37  There are always beacons of light, and this provides 





  Not even the memory of having been tortured is sufficient.  See Todorov, supra note 32, at 18–26 
(discussing—and dismissing—the potentially ―favorable‖ and ―unfavorable‖ factors influencing an in-
dividual‘s likelihood of becoming a torturer). 
35
  See LUBAN, supra note 20, at 240–41 (emphasizing that about one-third of the subjects refused to 
continue administering shocks). 
36
  In contrast to the more political lawyers, some German lawyers, mostly in the Abwehr (the Third 
Reich‘s military intelligence agency), consistently argued for the application of the Geneva and Hague 
conventions to those captured by the German army during World War II.  See Scott Horton, Through a 
Mirror Darkly: Applying the Geneva Conventions to “A New Kind of Warfare,” in THE TORTURE 
DEBATE IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 136.  Most of these lawyers ultimately became victims of the 
Gestapo.  Id. 
37
  See discussion infra note 39 and accompanying text. 
38
  While it is encouraging to remember these beacons, I cannot believe the solution is simply to fig-
ure out how to ―systematically produce more beacons‖ among American lawyers.  See Todorov, supra 
note 32, at 18–26.  I do not believe that we can realistically hope to socially engineer lawyers to be will-
ing to be shot by Nazis, rather than simply to sign the legal memoranda the Nazis request.   
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The U.S. government lawyers who, by and large, consistently objected 
to torture were the Judge Advocate General (―JAG‖) lawyers.  It was the 
JAG lawyers, rather than the civilian lawyers, who dissented from the pro-
torture objective.39  The dissenting role of these lawyers in the torture de-
bate has been well documented by the Senate Armed Services Committee.40  
What drove the JAG lawyers to dissent?  In the simplest terms, I be-
lieve it was their fear—a fear of the consequences of violating the categori-
cal imperative, the golden rule.  It was a fear in their guts, not in their heads.  
They feared that Americans torturing those in their custodial care would ul-
timately result in Americans being tortured.  And this fear was not abstract.  
It was a deep realization that powerless men, men with children, wives, and 
memories of sunshine and ease would be maimed and mutilated.  It was a 
fear that they could be among the victims.  It was the fear that they could 
pay dearly for endorsing torture—if not themselves personally, then those 
with whom they personally identified: fellow soldiers.  I believe it was this 
empathetic identification that differentiated those who dissented from those 
who did not.  It was the fear of suffering the consequences of their own de-
cisions. 
Perhaps the right kind of fear is essential to moral resolve.  Perhaps 
deeply fearing that we will become the victims of our own moral decisions 
imparts moral clarity.  Those who support state violence always believe 
they will be protected by the state rather than subjected to its violence.41  
Those who support torture believe they will be protected by the torture they 
support; they do not believe they will ever be subjected to it.42  The deep 
fear that our own moral decisions will damn us cannot be lost.  To put it in 
old and unambiguous language: the deep worry that we will go to hell if we 
take the wrong turn keeps us on the straight path.  The JAG lawyers, it 
seems, could more easily imagine what that hell would look like and how it 
is they would get there.43  I suggest that their imaginations allowed them to 
connect the risks of their reasoning with the reality of human pain in a way 
that made them realize the moral risk was their own and not someone 
else‘s.  There was no room for deference.  The risk could be neither dele-





  Neuborne et al., supra note 5, at 16–17. 
40
  See The Origins of Aggressive Interrogation Techniques Hearings, supra note 5; 151 CONG. REC. 
S878972–S88013 (daily ed. July 25, 2005) (documenting many of the lawyers‘ activities). 
41
  See Athey, supra note 27, at 98.   
42
  See id.  Perhaps torture supporters blame the victim; that is, perhaps they believe there is some-
thing about the victim that makes torturing him at least somewhat justifiable.  Often such a belief is 
based on some distinction the torturer creates between himself and the victim.  Cf. Luban, supra note 9, 
at 291. 
43
  Cf. Pilar Calveiro, Torture’s New Methods and Meanings, in ON TORTURE, supra note 27, at 124 
(William Nichols & Thomas C. Hilde trans.).  These lawyers did not have an obscured awareness of the 
implications for ―one‘s other, one‘s equal, and oneself‖; for them it was not a ―game.‖  Id. 
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IV. IMPLICATIONS 
I fear that, as lawyers, we have been convinced that we do not risk hell 
when we implement our client‘s objectives.44  If we cannot resurrect a fear 
of hell among ourselves, then at the very least we should stop telling our-
selves that overcoming personal moral squeamishness is the great call of the 
law.  We should stop the professional program of suffocating the light that 
flickers in personal consciences.  If I would not foreclose on a particular or-
phanage, I should not be encouraged to help someone else to foreclose upon 
it.  If I would not drown a man to make him talk, I should not be encour-
aged to help someone else to do it.  The orphanage may still be foreclosed 
upon, or the man drowned, but not with my help.  Some other lawyer may 
help, but not at a cost to my conscience.    
It should not be controversial to claim that the rule of law is better pro-
tected by those who are responsive to conscience than it is by those who in-
tentionally disregard conscience for pay and promotions.  But it is.  It is 
inconsistent with the self-understanding of the contemporary bar.  One 
long-term project needs to be pulling away the comfortable insulation law-
yers feel in deferring to the bar‘s self-serving assurance of what is moral.45  
To extend the religious imagery, I submit that God has delegated nothing to 
the American Bar Association.  What is morally required of each us is not a 
bar committee‘s decision.  Lawyers, as individuals, need to struggle with 
the discomfort caused by a dis-integrated moral personality, and with the 
numerous moral anomalies routinely defended in the name of a well-paying 
professionalism.  Each of us must choose what kind of person to be.  That 
choice ought to determine our professional choices.  If we choose to im-
plement a client‘s objective, it ought to be because doing so reflects what 
we personally value, not because we have been assured that what we help 
our clients do does not reflect our ―nonprofessional‖ personal morality.  
I speculate that many fewer lawyers would sign off on torture if legal 
education did not begin with dis-integrating the skills for intellectual agility 
from the skills for moral resolution.  How different the bar would be if law 
schools convinced young lawyers that what they implement for clients does 
reflect their personal morality.  How different the bar would be if lawyers 
spent 2,400 hours a year working from the conviction that they are perso-
nally responsible rather than from the conviction that they are not.  But, as 
it stands, we do not train moral leaders in our law schools; we train facilita-
tors.  We do not expect lawyers to say ―no;‖ we expect lawyers to figure out 





  Perhaps clients are taking their cues as to the morality of their actions from their lawyers‘ silence, 
while the lawyers are taking their cues from the clients.  Luban describes this process as ―pluralistic ig-
norance,‖ in which the lawyers and the clients reinforce one another‘s wrong beliefs.  Luban, supra note 
9, at 284 (emphasis omitted).  
45
  See generally LUBAN, supra note 20 (analyzing the implications of professional ethics for human 
dignity and the rule of law). 
